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NOTES
THE ROLE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL IN DETERMINING THE INSURER'S
DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY
Under a liability insurance policy, an insurance company under-
takes two basic obligations: to defend and to indemnify its insured
within the terms of the policy.1 When the facts and pleadings in a suit
against the insured are covered by the terms of the policy, the insur-
ance company must not only defend the insured, but also must pay
any judgment rendered against him, or reimburse the insured if he pays
the judgment.2 The duties to defend and to indemnify, however, are
not necessarily coextensive,3 for in some cases the insurance company
may be obligated to defend its insured but will not be obligated to pay
a judgment rendered against him.4
If a policy holder is sued for damages that the insurer believes
are not covered by the policy, the insurer may seek to avoid any lia-
bility by refusing either to defend or indemnify the insured. Should
the insurance company be uncertain of its obligations under the insur-
ance contract, however, it is confronted with a dilemma; by relying
on its own determination that it has no duty to defend the insured
and refusing to do so, it may be liable for breaching the insurance con-
tract5 and can be held liable for damages to the full extent of an ad-
1. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 944 (4th ed. 1951); 1 R. LoNG, LAW oF
LrRILrry INsuRANcE § 1.02(1) (1969).
2. There is a distinction between a liability and indemnity insurance policy.
An action against the insurer in an indemnity policy lies only after an actual loss has
occurred and the insured has discharged his liability. The coverage in a liability
policy attaches when the insured becomes liable. American Employer's Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562, 36 S.W. 1051 (1896); Fenton v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 36 Ore.
283, 56 P. 1096 (1899); Shealey v. American Health Ins. Corp., 220 S.C. 79, 66 S.E.2d
461 (1951). In a liability policy the payment is due when judgment is rendered
against the insured. Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495,
246 N.W. 202 (1933). These terms will not be used according to their technical
meaning here, however, because the distinction is not important within the context of
this article.
3. See text accompanying notes 33-39 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 33-39 infra.
5. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958); McFayden v. North River Ins. Co., 62 III. App. 2d 164, 170-71, 209
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verse judgment. This is so even though the policy in question pro-
vides that the company has only the duty to defend, not to indemnify.'
If, on the other hand, the company chooses to defend the insured, it
must bear the cost of the defense; but what is more important, in
cases where the damage complained of is adjudged to be of a type that is
covered by the insurance policy, the insurer may be collaterally estopped
from asserting its defense of noncoverage in a later action on the policy.
7
Thus, the insurer, by refusing to defend an action against its policy
holder, may be breaching its contract with him, while if it does defend
the action it may be forfeiting its rights under the policy's exclusions.
Declaratory Relief
The Value of Declaratory Relief
The insurance company can solve this dilemma by resorting to
declaratory relief while the action against its insured is still pending.8
Through this widely used 9 discretionary remedy'0 a court can determine
N.E.2d 833, 836 (1965); Butler Bros. v. American Fidelity Co., 120 Minn. 157, 163,
139 N.W. 355, 357 (1913).
6. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 278-80, 419 P.2d 168, 178-79, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 113-15 (1966); McFayden v. North River Ins. Co., 62 Ml1. App. 2d 164,
170-71, 209 N.E.2d 833, 836 (1965).
Statutes generally enable the injured party to sue the insurer directly once a
judgment has been rendered within the terms of the policy. Night, Determination of
Liability Insurance Policy Defenses by Declaratory Actions, 8 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27,
28 n.4 (1956); see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.
7. See cases cited note 83 infra.
8. While the availability of declaratory relief provides a legal channel by which
the insurer might determine its coverage, as a practical matter, it is not a panacea.
The declaratory action will frequently not proceed to trial until after the personal in-
jury suit has been decided, thereby defeating the purpose of the delcaratory action.
See IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 0.411 [6], at 1558 n.19 (2d ed. 1965); see
note 10 infra.
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02 (1964); FED. R. Civ. P. 57; CAL. CODE Cv.
PROC. H§ 1060-62. THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT § 1-411 has been
adopted in most states. 9A U.L.A. § 1-411 (Supp. 1967); 2 B. WrrmhN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE § 447, at 1427 (1954).
10. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1061 provides: 'The court may refuse to exercise
the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is
not necessary or proper at the time under the circumstances." The court's discretionary
power is implied in the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02
(1964). Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1937). According
to Borchard, the crucial question in the insurer's attempt to gain a declaration of
noncoverage while the personal injury suit is pending is the discretionary power of the
court: "The insurance cases which have attracted the most attention to the declaratory
judgment are those in which a casualty company institutes an action against the insured,
joining or not joining the injured parties, for a declaration that the company is not under
a duty to defend or to pay any eventual judgment, because the injury or death is not with-
in the coverage of the policy or because the company has some defense which exempts
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the rights of parties before those rights have been violated."1 If the
court exercises its discretion to grant declaratory relief on both the
duty to defend and the duty to indemnify, the insurance company can
ascertain its obligations under the policy12 and have any disputed facts1"
decided before undertaking the insured's defense.
14
Courts have found declaratory relief to be a simple and socially
valuable method to determine the insurer's duty to defend.15 In most
jurisdictions, the insurer has an obligation to defend if the facts, as al-
leged in the complaint, fall within the coverage of the policy.16 The
it. The courts, especially in New Hampshire and the federal courts, having at once con-
ceded that the issue presented a 'case' or 'controversy,' made the propriety of issuing the
declaration turn on questions of policy and discretion in trying the issue of non-liability
or limited liability before the suit of the injured person for negligence had been
litigated to judgment, and raised the question whether that suit should be stayed or the
company relegated to its defense in that suit." E. BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
646-47 (2d ed. 1941).
The court's decision is upheld unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Maguire v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 719, 731-32, 146 P.2d 673, 679-80
(1944); see 2 B. WrrmnN, CAriORNr PRocEnuRn § 450, at 1433 (1954).
11. 'It [declaratory relief] was designed to supply the need for a form of action
that would set controversies at rest before they lead to the repudiation of obligations
... ." Post v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156, 159, 237 N.Y.S. 64,
68 (1929), affld, 254 N.Y. 541, 173 N.E. 857 (1930); see Universal Carloading & Dist.
Co. v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 9 Misc. 2d 177, 178, 167 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (Sup. Ct.
1957), CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1060.
12. Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., I N.Y.2d 584, 591-92, 136 N.E.2d 871,
875, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 916 (1956); Universal Carloading & Distrib. Co. v. Merchants
Mut. Cas. Co., 9 Misc. 2d 177, 178, 167 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1957); CA..
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1060.
13. Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Cox, 154 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Cal. 1957); General Ins. Co. v. Whitmore, 235
Cal. App. 2d 670, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1965).
14. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Manning, 92 F.2d 168, rev'g 16 F. Supp. 430
(S.D. Wash. 1937); see Kellogg Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 282 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.
Fla. 1968); E. BORCHARD, supra note 10, at 646-47.
15. See E. BoRcHARD, supra note 10, at 634.
16. McFayden v. North River Ins. Co. 62 Ill. App. 2d 164, 170, 209 N.E.2d
833, 836 (1965); Pow-Well Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co.,
195 Misc. 251, 254-55, 89 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473-74 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949); see Lee v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); Boyle v. National Cas. Co.,
84 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSutRANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 4683 (1942). If the complaint alleges liability which is not within the
policy coverage, there is generally no duty to defend. Boyle v. National Cas. Co., 84
A.2d 614,. 615 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951) (citing cases); Brodek v. Indemnity Ins.
Co., 292 Ill. App. 363, 11 N.E.2d 228 (1937); Fessenden School, Inc. v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193 N.E. 558 (1935). However, the obligation
to defend is not affected by the facts giving rise to the primary litigation. See Lamb
v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935); Leonard v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 58 Kan. 263, 146 P.2d 378 (1944); Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297
N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1948); Grand Union Co. v. General Accident, Fire & Life
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court, therefore, need only consider the language of the complaint to-
gether with the language of the policy to determine whether the insurer
has a duty to defend the action. If the insurer is able to obtain this
preliminary declaration of its duties to defend and indemnify, it may be
able to avoid both the defense costs and any possible indemnity obli-
gations under the policy. A declaratory judgment which determines
that the insurer has both the duty to defend and to indemnify the in-
sured at least avoids the necessity of a second suit on the policy. Even
though the declaratory judgment may establish only that the insurer
must defend its insured and leaves the indemnity question undecided,
the insurance company is not forced to suffer the consequences of its
own determination of the legal question of whether it has a duty to
defend.
To help clarify the insurer's legal obligations, courts generally
grant declaratory relief to the extent of deciding the insurer's duty to
defend.17 They have been more hesitant, however, in granting de-
claratory relief with respect to the duty to indemnify.18  In some situ-
ations, the obligations to defend and to indemnify are determined by
different tests;19 and where this is so, the duty to defend is greater.
20
As a result, the insurer may have an obligation to defend its insured
though it may not be required to pay a judgment against him; in
such a case a court will not decide the indemnity question by a declara-
tory judgment.2'
Assurance Corp., 254 App. Div. 274, 4 N.Y.S.2d 704, ajI'd, 279 N.Y. 638, 18 N.E. 38
(1938); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d
199 (1945).
17. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. Merchants Cas. Co., 9 Misc.
2d 177, 178, 167 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1957). "[T]he general purpose of an
action for a declaratory judgment is to serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing
an uncertain or disputed jural relation ....... Id. Borchard stated that "[niot only
is the company relieved by a judgment in its favor from defending a negligence action
against the insured, but the determination of the fundamental economic fact that there
is 'no coverage' enlightens and guides the injured person and the insured. Indeed, such
a determination has basic importance for all parties concerned in the negligence action,
whether an injunction against its continuance is issued or not, for a suit against an
impecunious insured unsupported by a responsible insurer may not be pursued, or else
the passive indifference of the insured may well be converted into self-reliant defense."
E. BORCHARD, supra note 10, at 634-35.
18. See text accompanying notes 27-43 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 27-30 infra.
20. See text accompanying note 50 infra. Compare General Ins. Co. v. Whit-
more, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 677, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (1965) and Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729-30 (1962),
with Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
21. See text accompanying notes 27-43 infra.
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Grounds of Asserted Noncoverage--The Determinant of the
Scope of Declaratory Relief
When the insurer sues for a declaration of its obligations under
the insurance contract, its theory of noncoverage determines whether
the declaratory judgment will settle both issues of the duty to defend
and the duty to indemnify. There are three ways by which the insurer
can avoid having to pay a judgment against its insured. The first is by
proving that the insured breached some basic condition of coverage un-
der the policy, for instance by failing to pay his premiums or failing to
give the insurer prompt notice of the accident which gave rise to the
suit.22 The second is that if the interpretation of the language in the
policy is in dispute but the facts of the case are undisputed, the insurer
can avoid having to indemnify its insured by showing that the language
of the policy does not cover those undisputed facts.23 The third is that
if there is a dispute in the facts of the case but no dispute over the
interpretation of the policy language, the insurer can avoid paying the
judgment by showing that the injury complained of is not covered by the
terms of the policy.
24
Where the insurer is successful in any of the three situations de-
scribed, it has no duty to pay a judgment rendered against its insured.
In addition, in the first two situations, where the insurer successfully
shows that the insured has breached a condition of coverage or that the
policy does not extend to the undisputed facts of the case, there
ordinarily is not even a duty to defend.25 In these two situations the
duty to defend is coextensive with the duty to indemnify, so a declar-
atory judgment on the insurer's duty to defend a suit against its insured
22. See, e.g., Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 148 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1945); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 179 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D. Minn.
1959); Bagley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 99 Colo. 300, 62 P.2d 469 (1936);
Medico v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 132 Me. 422, 172 A. 1 (1934); American
Sur. Co. v. Mariani, 130 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1954), affd mem., 286 App, Div.
1083, 147 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1955).
23. See, e.g., Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d
19 (1956); Leonard v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158 Kan. 263, 146 P.2d 378 (1944).
24. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp.
983 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275-77, 419 P.2d
168, 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112-13 (1966); Pow-Well Heating Inc. v. Merchants
Mut. Cas. Co., 195 Misc. 251, 89 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949).
25. Comment, Insurance Company's Dilemma: Defending Actions Against the
Assured, 2 STAN. L. REv. 383, 391 (1950); see Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v.
Readnour, 241 F.2d 14, 16 (10th Cir. 1956); Trieber v. Hobson, 27 App. Div. 2d 151,
152, 277 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242-43 (1967); American Sur. Co. v. Mariani, 130 N.Y.S.2d
755 (Sup. Ct. 1954), affd mem., 286 App. Div. 1083, 147 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1955); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Baldwin Motor Co., 34 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931); see cases cited note 16 supra.
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would be determinative of both duties.28
In the third situation, however, where the insurer denies coverage
on the ground that the disputed facts of the case are not covered by the
undisputed terms of the policy, the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify are not coextensive.17  This is because, in the declaratory
judgment action, for purposes of determining the existence of a duty
to defend, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true, while the
issue of the insurer's duty to indemnify is not settled until the issues of
fact are decided in the main action. The courts properly refuse to
determine issues of fact basic to the main action in the declaratory judg-
ment action brought by the insurer; s such a premature determination
of facts would entail a useless expense of time, effort and money if the
insured were subsequently found not liable.29
It often happens that the same factual issues determine both the
liability of the insured and the indemnity obligation of the insurer.30
Where this is so, the courts also consider it desirable to postpone liti-
gation of the indemnity issue until the outcome of the injured party's
26. "[W]hen the dispute is such that it depends on matters dehors the basic
negligence action, the Courts have taken jurisdiction of the action for declaratory
judgment." Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mix, 159 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
See Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Readnour, 241 F.2d 14, 16 (10th Cir. 1956);
Associated Indem. Corp. v. Davis, 45 F. Supp. 118 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Trieber v.
Hopson, 27 App. Div. 2d 151, 152, 277 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242-43 (1967); American Sur.
Co. v. Mariani, 130 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1954), ajJ'd mem., 286 App. Div. 1083,
147 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1955). See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
27. See Karpe v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 226, 233-34, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 908, 913 (1961); Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524,
527, 343 P.2d 311, 313 (1959).
28. Wolff Sons, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 286 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1961);
Kellogg Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 282 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Prashker v.
United States Guar. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 584, 136 N.E.2d 871, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1956);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 14 App. Div. 2d 188, 217 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1961);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Burg, 253 App. Div. 43, 1 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1937); Brooklyn
& Queens Allied Burner Service Co. v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 401, 208
N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mayfield, 13 Misc. 2d 381
171 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1958); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties,
Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v.
Beals, 240 A.2d 397 (R.I. 1968).
29. E. BORCHARD, supra note 10, at 654. "[A] declaration need not be granted
if it will not serve a useful purpose." Id.
Where the insured is required to defend, declaratory judgment on the indemnity
issue is withheld until the insured's liability is established. Kellogg Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 282 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gleason, 50
Ill. App. 2d 207, 200 N.E.2d 383 (1964).
30. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 14 App. Div. 2d 188, 217 N.Y.
S.2d 680 (1961); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Burg, 253 App. Div. 43, 1 N.Y.S.2d 172
(1937); Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mayfield, 13 Misc. 2d 381, 171 N.Y.S.2d 708
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
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suit."1 This situation arises in two ways. First, it arises when the same
facts both establish noncoverage and exempt the insured from liability. 2
For example, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dennis,33 an
automobile liability policy covered both the named insured and those
who drove his car with his permission. The automobile was involved
in an accident while another person was driving. The insurance com-
pany sought a declaration that it had neither the duty to defend nor the
duty to indemnify the driver or the insured because the driver was driv-
ing without the permission of the insured. Since a finding in the main
suit that the driver was driving without permission would have relieved
the owner of any liability,34 the court granted a declaration that the in-
surer had to defend both the driver and the insured, but refused to de-
cide whether it also had a duty to indemnify them. The court rea-
soned that, since the insurer could present the permission issue and have
it determined in the pending suit, it was not necessary to litigate that
issue in a separate action. 5
The same facts also determine both the insured's liability and the
insurer's indemnity obligation where the facts that would establish non-
coverage would harm the insured's interests in his litigation with the in-
jured party;( but of course, the insurer cannot assert such a fact in the
later suit, because to do so would breach its duty to defend in the in-
sured's best interests.3 7 For example, in Employer's Fire Insurance
Co. v. Beals,"' the policy covered negligence but not intentional
torts. The action against the insured alleged both negligence and an
intentional tort. The insurance company sued for a declaration that
the injuries were intentionally caused and that it therefore had no duty
either to defend in the main action or to pay 'any judgment. The court
held that the insurer had a duty to defend but denied declaratory relief
on the issue of indemnification. It argued that, since the injured party
was joined as a plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action, a declaration
on the intentional nature of the tort would force a "dress rehearsal" of
the most important issue to be tried in the personal injury suit and
31. See text accompanying notes 32-43 infra.
32. See, e.g., cases cited note 30 supra.
33. 14 App. Div. 188, 217 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1961).
34. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Burg, 253 App. Div. 43, 46-47, 1 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176
(1937) (concurring opinion).
35. 14 App. Div. at 189, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
36, E.g., Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397 (R.L 1968).
37. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 647, 394 P.2d 571,
577, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 737 (1964); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 406 (1968); Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Minn. 315, 116 N.W.2d 593 (1962); Szabo
v. Standard Commercial Body Corp., 221 App. Div. 722, 225 N.Y.S. 332 (1927); Roos,
The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HAST. L.J 206, 211-213
(1961).
38. 240 A.2d 397 (R.L 1968).
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thereby unjustly wrest control of the litigation from the injured party. 9
A further reason for postponing determination of the insurer's in-
demnity obligation in a situation like that presented in the Beals case is
that a declaratory judgment on this issue would prejudice the rights of
the injured party by the operation of collateral estoppel.4" Since the
injured party is a party to the declaratory action, the judgment there
would bind him in any subsequent litigation against the insured.4 Sup-
pose, for instance, the injured party plans to base his suit on a theory
of intentional tort so that he can ask for punitive damages. If the in-
sured's actions are held to be within the coverage of the policy, the
injured party would be prevented from asserting in the personal injury
action that the insured's conduct was intentional.
In refusing to declare whether or not the facts exempt the insurer
from an obligation to indemnify, courts have generally relied upon such
narrow reasons as those discussed above.42 The cases, however, sup-
port a general rule that the insurer cannot obtain a declaration that it
need not indemnify its insured unless the court's decision would at the
same time resolve the issue of the defense obligation. Nevertheless, the
courts have not yet stated their conclusion this broadly.
43
Declaratory Relief in California Prior to Determination
of the Insured's Liability
Present California law is unsettled on the question whether de-
claratory relief can be used to determine that the disputed facts of a case
exclude the injury complained of from insurance coverage. Two Cal-
ifornia cases have allowed declaratory relief for this purpose. In Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Co. v. Chasson,44 the insurance company
sought a declaration that its automobile liability policy excluded an
accident from coverage because at the time of the accident the insured's
vehicle was being used as a public or livery conveyance, though the in-
jured party's complaint did not allege any facts to exclude the accident
from policy coverage. In General Insurance Co. v. Whitmore,45
the injured party's complaint alleged negligence, a theory of liability
clearly covered by the policy; but the insurer contended that the insured
intentionally caused the injuries so that the case was excluded from
coverage. In both cases the courts allowed declaratory relief to deter-
mine whether the insurers had any obligations under their policies.
39. Id. at 400.
40. See note 78 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 78-82 infra.
42. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
43. See cases cited note 28 supra.
44. 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 24 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1962).
45. 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1965).
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Both courts concluded that the injuries were not covered by the insur-
ance; therefore, the insurers were obligated neither to defend their in-
sureds nor to pay any judgment rendered against them.4"
Although apparently in conflict with the rule in other jurisdictions,
these cases are reconcilable with the refusal of other courts to grant a
declaratory judgment on the indemnity obligation of an insurer who
must defend a suit.4" When the insurer denies coverage by claiming
the injury sued on is not covered by the terms of the policy, jurisdictions
other than California first determine whether the insurer must defend48
by examining the allegations in the injured party's complaint.49 These
courts disregard any disputed facts of the case in deciding whether the
insurer must defend; and once a duty to defend arises it continues until
judgment in the main action, unless the complaint is amended.50
The California courts in the Chasson and Whitmore cases agreed
with the majority view that the language of the complaint initially deter-
mines the duty to defend and that the duty to defend continues until the
case is clearly placed outside the policy's coverage. 51 These courts,
however, departed from the procedure followed by other courts by con-
sidering the insured's duty to indemnify before they considered its duty
to defend. Since the duty to defend continues only until the injury
sued on is clearly excluded from coverage, the California courts held
that the duty to defend ceased when the decision. that there was no
indemnity obligation became final and the time for appeal had run.52
By reversing the order in which the duties to defend and indemnify are
decided, these cases necessarily lead to the conclusion that in a declara-
tory relief action the duty to defend is determined by the actual facts,
whereas in other jurisdictions the defense obligation is determined by
46. General Ins. Co. v. Whitmore, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 677, 45 Cal. Rptr.
556, 561 (1965); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 807, 24
Cal. Rptr. 726, 729-30 (1962).
47. See text accompanying notes 27-43 supra.
48. For this purpose the court assumes the plaintiff's allegations to be true. See
text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
49. See cases cited note 16 supra.
50. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949). The
court explained that whenever the complaint alleges tortious misconduct within the
indemnity coverage of the policy, the case has not been placed outside the policy's
coverage and the duty to defend exists. If the insurer cannot compel the injured
party to change the allegations, the indemnity obligation will remain uncertain until
the end of the trial. Id. at 752-53.
51. Compare text accompanying notes 16-17 & note 16 supra, with Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (1962) and
General Ins. Co. v. Whitmore, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 676-77, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561
(1965).
52. See General Ins. Co. v. Whitmore, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 677, 45 Cal. Rptr.
556, 561 (1965); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 807,
24 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729-30 (1962).
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the allegations in the complaint. These cases thus extend the scope of
declaratory relief in California to allow determination of disputed facts
that would exclude the injury sued on from indemnity coverage. They
remain consistent, however, with the majority rule that a court in a
declaratory judgment action will not decide whether the insurer has an
indemnity obligation to its insured unless that decision would also settle
the question of the insurer's defense obligation.5"
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,5 4 a recent case decided by the
California Supreme Court, was an action in which an insured sued his
comprehensive liability insurer for the amount of a judgment rendered
against him for assault and battery. Although the policy contained an
exclusion for injuries intentionally caused, the court held the insurer
liable to Gray, the insured, because it had breached its duty to defend.55
At no time did the insurer seek a judicial declaration that it had no
policy obligations. Thus, the case did not directly present the question
of whether the insurer could obtain such a declaration. The broad
language of Gray, however, weakens the Chasson and Whitmore cases
as authority for the position that declaratory relief is available to deter-
mine the insurer's indemnity obligation.56
The opinion in Gray contains two separate holdings. The court
first interpreted the terms of the policy to require the insurer to de-
fend a suit for assault and battery. The policy guaranteed the de-
fense of any suit, even if the allegations in the complaint were "ground-
less, false or fraudulent," '58 and the court interpreted this broad lan-
guage to require the insurer to defend against claims that its insured
had acted wrongfully, even if the pleadings alleged that the injuries
were caused intentionally.59
The court ruled that, although the policy's exclusion would not re-
quire the company to indemnify its insured for assault and battery, it
still had the obligation to defend such suits, since the policy did not
53. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
54. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
55. Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113; see Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1328, 1330
(1967).
56. See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
57. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 267-68, 419 P.2d 168, 169-70, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 105-06
(1966).
58. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (1966).
59. Gray rejected the insurer's contention that the defense coverage was limited
to claims which were payable under the policy: "The basic promise [to defend] would
support the insured's reasonable expectation that he had bought the rendition of legal
services to defend against a suit for bodily injury which alleged he had caused it,
negligently, nonintentionally, intentionally, or in any other manner." Id. at 273, 419
P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (1966).
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clearly exclude them from coverage. 60 Because the court held that the
exclusionary clause applied only to the indemnity obligation,6 a de-
claratory judgment that the case was excluded from indemnity coverage
would not have released the insurer from its duty to defend. For that
reason, in any case involving the same standardized exclusion for in-
tentional misconduct construed in Gray, the insurer will not be able to
obtain a decision on whether it must indemnify its insured until the
issue of the insured's liability is decided.6"
In its second holding, the court said that, even if the duty to de-
fend had to be determined by the allegations in the injured party's com-
plaint against the insured, as argued by the defendant insurance com-
pany, the insurer's argument still failed, for the complaint alleging an
intentional tort potentially sought damages within the scope of the
policy. 3 This holding necessarily assumed, arguendo, that the policy
60. Id. at 274-75, 419 P.2d at 174-76, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110-12 (1966).
61. Id.
62. Although Gray dealt with a specific policy exclusion in a comprehensive
insurance policy, the courts may also interpret other policy exclusions, including those
in automobile, homeowners', and other forms of liability insurance, to limit only the
indemnity coverage and to require the insured's defense. Based on the reasoning in
Gray, in all cases where the insurer must defend, declaratory relief will not be available
to settle the indemnity question.
Since Gray, a new standardized policy has been widely used. Although the new
policy stresses that the extent of the insurer's defense obligation is limited by the policy's
exclusions, it has been suggested that the new policy will probably be interpreted so
as to require a defense for intentional misconduct. B. CRocKER, The Continuing
Importance of Gray v. Zurich, 43 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 239, 260-62 (1968).
63. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275-77, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13 (1966).
In California, the theory on which any plaintiff relies may be easily changed. For
example, although the injured party pleads an intentional tort, he may eventually re-
cover on a theory of negligence. As the court in Gray stated: "Since modem proce-
dural rules focus on the facts of a case rather than the theory of recovery in the com-
plaint, the duty to defend should be fixed by the facts which the insurer learns from the
complaint, the insured, or other sources....
"[Dlespite Jones' pleading of intentional and wilful conduct, he could have amended
his complaint to allege merely negligent conduct." Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77,
54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13. Thus, under the test of Gray the insurer cannot avoid the
obligation to defend even if the allegations in the complaint are outside the policy's
coverages. Id. at 275-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
The limitations of the defense obligation under the test announced in Gray are
unclear. For a discussion of the problem, see Crocker, The Continuing Importance of
Gray v. Zurich, 43 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 239 (1968); Comment, Liability Insurance:
Specific Exclusion of Liability for Injury Intentionally Caused by the Insured, 12 S.D.
L. REv. 373 (1967); Comment, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend Suits for Intentional
Injury, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 271 (1967); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made
Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rtv. 1328 (1967).
The court used the potential indemnity coverage, rather than the injured party's
pleadings, as the test of the insurer's defense obligation. It realized that the actual
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exclusion applied to the insurer's defense obligation as well as to its
indemnity obligation. The effect of this holding was that, even if the
policy exclusion for injuries intentionally caused was clearly intended to
limit the defense duty, the insurer would still have been obliged to de-
fend the suit for assault and battery 4 because the injured party might
eventually recover on a theory of liability not originally urged in the com-
plaint. In its statement that the insurer must defend any suit "which
potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy,"65 the court
recognized that the duty to defend exists until it is clearly established
that the case is outside the indemnity coverage of the policy. This
statement of the test of the duty to defend extends that duty beyond
the limits established in most jurisdictions.66
Since Gray, only one California case has raised the question whether
declaratory relief is available to the insurer to establish that the disputed
facts of a case exclude the injury complained of from coverage. In
General of America Insurance Co. v. Lilly,67 the driver and owner
of a truck were joined as defendants in an action for damages. The
injured party alleged that the driver had used the vehicle with the
owner's permission. The insurer sought a declaration that it had no
policy obligations, claiming that the driver did not have the permission
of the owner-insured, as required for coverage under the policy. The
court ruled that the insurer had to defend but then refused to grant the
insurer a declaration of its indemnity obligation.
This refusal is reconcilable with the two earlier California cases
that granted declaratory relief. 6s In those cases the facts establishing
noncoverage would have weakened the insured's position if presented in
the main suit brought by the injured party. The insurer in the Chasson
case could not assert in the main suit its policy defense that the vehicle
was used as a public or livery conveyance without damaging the insurer,
for a finding to that effect would have established that the injured
facts of the case, which determine the duty to indemnify, could not be used to deter-
mine the duty to defend, since these facts necessarily remained unsettled until the con-
clusion of the main suit: "Although insurers have often insisted that the duty [to
defend] arises only if the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured, this very con-
tention creates a dilemma. No one can determine whether the third party suit does or
does not fall within the indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is re-
solved . . . . The carrier's obligation to indemnify inevitably will not be defined until
the adjudication of the very action which it should have defended." 65 Cal. 2d 263,
271-72, 419 P.2d 168, 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (1966).
64. 65 Cal. 2d at 275-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
65. Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (Italics in original).
66. See cases cited note 16 supra.
67. 258 Cal. App. 2d 465, 65 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1968).
68. General Ins. Co. v. Whitmore, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556
(1965); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 24 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1962).
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parties were passengers rather than guests and subjected the insured to
liability for ordinary negligence rather than for wilful misconduct or mis-
conduct due to intoxication.69 Likewise, in Whitmore, the insurer could
not properly argue in the main suit that the insured injured the plaintiff
in the main action intentionally rather than negligently. In the Lilly
case, on the other hand, if the insurer could have established that the
driver had not had the owner's permission to use the truck which caused
the injury, the owner would have been exempt from liability. Thus,
unlike the situations in the two earlier California cases, the facts in
Lilly that would have established exclusion from the policy also
would have promoted the insured's interests, so the insured was not
harmed by the insurer being required to wait until the main suit to raise
the facts that would have established noncoverage. 70
The different results in Lilly and the two earlier cases are further
warranted because courts generally construe an insurance contract most
strongly in favor of the insured."' In Lilly, a finding in the main suit
that the driver used the vehicle with the owner's permission would neces-
sarily have placed the case within the meaning of "permission" as used
in the insurance policy, 72 so that establishment of the insured's liability
in the main suit would also have settled the insurer's indemnity obli-
gation. In a situation like that presented by the Lilly case then, the
insurer's coverage obligations would be settled in the suit between the
injured party and the insured without requiring the insurance company
to bring a second suit against the insured to assert its policy exclusion.
The findings in a personal injury action, however, do not always
indicate whether the insured is entitled to indemnity coverage. The
reason is that, while courts liberally construe the coverage provisions
69. CAL. VETH. CODE § 17158: "No person riding in or occupying a vehicle
owned by him and driven by another person with his permission and no person who as a
guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for
such ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the
driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the
ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death
proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver."
A public or livery conveyance is defined as a "vehicle used for carrying passengers
for compensation." BALLANTnVe'S LAW DICTIONARY 746, 1020 (3d ed. 1969) (citing
cases).
70. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 470-71, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
71. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 274, 419 P.2d 168, 174-75, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-11 (1966); Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613,
619-21, 364 P.2d 833, 836-38, 15 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900-02 (1961).
72. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 470-71, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 754 (1968); see Exchange
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 620-21, 364 P.2d 833, 837-38 15 Cal. Rptr.
897, 901-02 (1961); Comment, Insurance Company's Dilemma: Defending Actions
Against the Assured, 2 STAN. L. REV. 383, 391 (1950).
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of insurance contracts in favor of the insured, they place a strict inter-
pretation on the policy exclusions.7" For example, a finding in the main
suit that the insured committed an intentional tort does not necessarily
establish intentional misconduct under the meaning of the policy ex-
clusion.74  Likewise, a finding that the occupant of an automobile paid
for a ride does not establish by itself that the vehicle was used as a
public conveyance.75 In such situations, then, the injury sued on is not
necessarily excluded from coverage, and the insurer may be forced to
bring a subsequent suit to have its indemnity obligation adjudicated.
Therefore, in cases such as Chasson76 and Whitmore,77 where an argu-
ment of noncoverage in the main action cannot be made because it
would prejudice the insured's interests against the injured party, it seems
not unreasonable for courts to allow declaratory relief in a separate
action before the main suit. This gives the insurer a forum in which
to assert its argument of noncoverage and also protects it from the ex-
pense of additional litigation if it is successful in the declaratory judgment
action.
Collateral Estoppel Subsequent to the Main Suit
The wisdom of California courts in granting declaratory relief on
the issue of the insurer's indemnity obligation cannot be fairly evaluated
without considering the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This doctrine
applies in a subsequent suit between the same parties to a prior action
or their privies to prevent them from relitigating matters that were tried
and determined in, and essential to, the final judgment of that prior
action.7s
Conflicting Views
When the insurance company has the obligation and opportunity
to defend its insured in a suit, it is a privy 9 with the insured in that
73. Cases cited note 71 supra.
74. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273 & n.12, 277, 419 P.2d 168, 174
& n.12, 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110 & n.12, 113 (1966).
75. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Chasson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 805, 24
Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (1962).
76. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
78. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 11.18, at 575-76 (1965); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effect of Prior
Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REv. 217, 217-18 (1953); Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 840 (1952). Collateral estoppel has also been re-
ferred to as "estoppel by judgment," Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672, 673, 38 S.E.2d
394, 395 (1946), and "estoppel by verdict," Wolfson v. Northern States Management
Co., 221 Minn. 474, 477, 22 N.W.2d 545, 547 (1946).
79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (4th ed. 1951) defines "privy" as "[olne who
is a partaker or has any part or interest in any action, matter, or thing."
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action.80 If the insured is adjudged liable for an injury determined to
be within the coverage.of the policy, the injured party becomes a judg-
ment creditor and therefore can sue the insurance company on the pol-
icy.81  In a subsequent suit brought either by the injured party as a
judgment creditor of the insured, or by the injured party himself for
indemnification, the law is unsettled whether collateral estoppel will
preclude the insurer from asserting noncoverage. 82  Even where the in-
surer could not have raised that issue in the main suit because of its
prejudicial effect on the insured, some authority indicates that the in-
surer is estopped from raising the defense of noncoverage in a subse-
quent suit between it and a party to the personal injury action.8 3 Most
proponents of this view, however, advocate that an alternative remedy
be made available by allowing the insurer to raise its defense in a de-
claratory action before the outcome of the personal injury suit.84 Other
authorities deny the use of declaratory relief to settle the insurer's in-
80. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 330 F.2d 250, 257
(9th Cir. 1964); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sturgis, 198 Ark. 574, 129 S.W.2d 599 (1939);
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 855-56 (1952); IB J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.411(6), at 1552-55 (2d ed. 1965).
81. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2).
82. The indemnitor is bound by the judgment against his indemnitee if he was
given reasonable notice and an opportunity to defend. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS,
§ 107(a) (1942); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.27, at 590 (1965). The insurer is
bound by the judgment if it defends. See, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
American Central Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 430, 9 P. 712 (1886). It is also bound by the
judgment if it does not defend. See Ford v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 151 Cal.
App. 2d 431, 438, 311 P.2d 930, 933 (1957).
83. The dissenting judge in Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793
(4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 914 (1950), wrote: "The fact that the company
could not assert in the original case that the injury was not negligent but intentional
without prejudicing the defense of that case means merely that the defense which it had
undertaken was difficult. It furnishes no ground for absolving the company from
application of the well settled rule that judgment rendered is binding upon it as to issues
actually adjudicated; and there can be no question but that the judgment adjudicated
that the injury in question resulted from the insured's negligence." Id. at 802. See
Miller v. United States Fidelity & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); Jusiak
v. Commercial Cas. Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 869, 169 A. 551 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Stefus v.
London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 A. 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933);
Comment, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend Suits for Intentional Injury, 24 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 271, 285-287 (1967).
84. "It cannot be denied that an insurer. . . is on the horns of a dilemma, insofar
as the action against the insured is concerned: given notice and an opportunity to
defend, the insurer is bound by the judgment on the negligence claim, whether or not
he defends; and, if he does defend, he cannot contend that the insured was guilty of
intentional wrong-doing. But the insurer is not entirely without a remedy: a suit
against the insured and the injured claimant for a declaratory judgment of non-coverage,
prior to the rendition of judgment in the suit against the insured, may be entertained at
the discretion of the appropriate court." IB J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTCE, 11 0.41116]
n.19, at 1557 (2d ed. 1965); see 3 VAND. L. REv. 798, 801-02 (1950).
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demnity obligation but would allow the insurer to raise its noncoverage
defense in a suit subsequent to the personal injury action.85
Miller v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co."" is the lead-
ing case applying collateral estoppel. After a judgment was rendered
against the insured on a complaint which alleged only negligence, the
court held that the insurer, who had refused to defend, was precluded
from raising the defense that the injuries were intentionally caused.
The court said:
Where an action against the insured is ostensibly within the terms
of the policy, the insurer, whether it assumes the defense or refuses
to assume it, is bound by the result of that action as to all matters
therein decided which are material to recovery by the insured in
an action on the policy.87
Since the insurer was a privy in the personal injury action, it was con-
clusively bound by the finding that the plaintiff's injury was negligently
caused, even though it could not have represented its own interests
in that action.
88
The leading case representing the contrary point of view, and re-
fusing to apply collateral estoppel on facts similar to those in Miller, is
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hammer.89 After
judgment in the main action on a theory of negligence, the in-
surer, who had refused to defend the insured, asserted its nonliability on
the grounds that the insured had intentionally caused the injuries. The
court allowed the insurer to raise the defense of noncoverage, recog-
nizing that the purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent the reliti-
gation of the same facts and issues between parties who have already
received a judicial hearing, the situation when the interests of the in-
surer and the insured are aligned.9 The court held that to the extent
85. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Pow-Well Plumbing & Heating, Inc., v. Merchant's Mut. Cas. Co., 195 Misc. 251,
89 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under A
Liability Insurance Policy, 114 PA. L. REv. 734, 741 (1966). The court in Ratliff
wrote: "In many instances it is more orderly and efficient and is in the best interest
of all parties concerned to have the question of coverage litigated in advance of the
trial of the basic controversy between the insured and the injured party. However, the
question of coverage need not necessarily be determined in advance of the determination
of the basic controversy, and the Court is of the opinion that advance determination of
the matter of coverage is not desirable where, as here, that question is closely and
directly connected with the issue of the insured's personal liability to the injured
party." Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, supra at 990.
86. 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935).
87. Id. at 448, 197 N.E. at 77.
88. See id.
89. 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
90. Id. at 799. The court in State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 148 N.E.2d
136, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958), said that two public policies underlie the application of
collateral estoppel: "The first is that a question once tried out should not be relitigated
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that the interests of the parties and their privies were not aligned, col-
lateral estoppel could not properly be applied because to do so would
estop the insurer by the acts of parties in a transaction in which it has
no concern and over which it has no control. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel should prevent a litigant from asserting its arguments twice,
not from having his day in court.91
The court in Hammer posed two alternative courses of action for an
insurance company faced with a suit against its insured in which it be-
lieved it had a possible noncoverage policy defense:
When the insurer desires to make the defense that the injuries are
not within the coverage of the policy it may take the risk of refusing
to defend the suit against the insured or it may be able to reserve
the defense of non-coverage for a subsequent suit under a non-
waiver agreement.
92
The court's choice of a second alternative, which was dictum, indi-
cated that it believed collateral estoppel would operate in a case where
the insurer elected to defend the insured without securing a reservation
of rights.
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Ratliff,"3 the insured had
rammed and overturned the injured party's car. He denied any
involvement in the incident, however; and the insurance company
elected to defend the suit brought by the injured party for damages based
on negligence. In a subsequent suit on the policy, the insurer denied
coverage of the incident because the policy it had issued excluded
coverage for the insured's intentional torts. The insured and the injured
parties claimed that, since the main suit conclusively determined that
the insured was liable for negligence, the insurer was estopped from
later denying it.94
The court, however, decided that the issue of the character of the
insured's conduct was still triable. Although the insurer did secure a
nonwaiver agreement as recommended in Hammer,95 the court appar-
ently did not rely on this as the basis for its holding. Except for a
recitation in the facts that the insurer had procured a nonwaiver agree-
between the same parties or their privies. The other public policy involved in collateral
estoppel and res judicata, however, is that these doctrines must not be allowed to operate
to deprive a party of an actual opportunity to be heard." Id. at 595, 148 N.E.2d at 138,
120 N.Y.S.2d at 798. See General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479,
483, 113 N.E.2d 844, 846 (1953); New York Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland
Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 493, 63 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1945); Hendrick v. Biggar, 209 N.Y.
440, 444, 103 N.E. 763, 764 (1913); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior
Litigation, 39 IowA L. RFv. 217, 218-21 (1953).
91. Id. at 799-800.
92. Id. at 780.
93. 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
94. Id. at 986.
95. Id. at 985.
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ment, there was no additional reference to it in the opinion. The
court instead emphasized the nonalignment of the interests of insurer
and insured. The court concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply
because the insurer had not yet had an opportunity to assert its con-
tention that the conduct of the insured was intentional:
[T]he question of the quality of Holland's conduct was raised in the
State court only as an issue in the primary controversy between
Ratliff and Holland. The question was not raised, and indeed
could not have been raised in that court, as a policy defense avail-
able to the Company as a party adverse to Holland or Ratliff,
or both.96
The common feature of both these cases is that where the interests
of insurer and insured conflict, the insurer has no effective opportunity
to litigate the issue of noncoverage in the personal injury action. The
application of collateral estoppel to the insurer and the insured is predi-
cated on their identity of interests and their common opportunity to
protect those interest in the main suit. 7 When the extent of the policy's
coverage is at issue, however, as it was in Hammer and Ratliff, the
interests of insurer and insured are in conflict. The insurance com-
pany cannot defend the insured in good faith and, at the same time,
protect its own interests.
The Sound Approach
A court that applies collateral estoppel indiscriminately in non-
coverage cases fails to recognize the distinction between cases in which
the insurer and the insured have aligned interests, and those in which
their interests conflict. Their interests will be aligned when the same
facts both establish noncoverage and exempt the insured from liabil-
ity98 Their interests will conflict when the facts that would establish
noncoverage would also tend to establish the insured's liability.9 To
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the latter situation is to per-
vert the doctrine's underlying policy. Therefore, the refusal of the
courts in Hammer and Ratliff to apply collateral estoppel to their par-
ticular facts was both practically and theoretically correct.
A further reason for not applying collateral estoppel when the in-
terests of insurer and insured are not aligned rests on public policy. _As
the court in Ratliff apparently recognized, the application of collateral
estoppel enables the injured party to circumvent the exclusionary clause
in the insured's policy.100  He can mold his complaint to allege facts
96. Id. at 986.
97. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 368 S.W.2d 734-37 (Ky. 1963).
98. See text accompanying note 32 supra and notes 105-09 infra.
99. See text accompanying note 36-37 supra.
100. See 242 F. Supp. at 986; accord, Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co.,
111 N.J.L. 6, 8-10, 166 A. 339, 340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) (dissenting opinion); Note,
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within the coverage of the insured's policy even though the actual facts
are clearly excluded from coverage. Through collateral estoppel, the in-
surer is then precluded from showing that the injured party fabricated
his complaint in order to reach the insurance company's deep pocket
and, in effect, circumvent the public policy which prohibits insuring
an individual against liability for intentional torts.10 1 The possibility of
such collusive conduct where the interests of the insurer and the in-
sured are in conflict, is perhaps the most compelling reason for refusing
to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Collateral Estoppel in California
The limitations on the application of collateral estoppel to cases
in which policy coverage is at issue are still unclear in California.
Several decisions have used language so broad as to suggest a preference
for applying the doctrine in all cases. 102 The cases that have applied
collateral estoppel, however, involved situations in which the insurer's
defense of noncoverage was also a defense to the insured's liability. 03
Since the interests of both insured and insurer were fully aligned in the
main suit, collateral estoppel was properly applied.
04
There are four situations in which collateral estoppel has been
applied in California: (1) where the insurer attempted to relitigate
The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1328, 1335 n.28; 63 HARv. L. REv. 898, 899 (1950).
101. The injured party had attempted to do exactly this in Ratliff. After his car
was rammed with him inside, he procured a warrant for the insured's arrest on a charge
of assault with intent to kill and filed a civil action alleging that the insured deliberately
rammed his vehicle, but later changed the theory of recovery in the civil action to
negligence and dropped the criminal charges because his attorneys realized that other-
wise the insured's policy exclusion might apply. Since the injured party could not
secure satisfaction from the impecunious insured, he strategically shaped his complaint
to recover from the funds of the insurance company. 242 F. Supp. at 986.
102. Artukovich v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 312, 320-21,
310 P.2d 461, 465-66 (1957) (quoting Miller with approval); Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co.,
3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 631, 40 P.2d 311, 314 (1935). In Karpe v. Great American
Indem. Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 226, 11 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961), the court said: "If
the complaint upon which that judgment is based alleges facts showing a liability
subject to coverage by his policy, the judgment also is conclusive evidence of these
facts." Id. at 231, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
103. See text accompanying notes 104-09 infra.
104. E.g., Escobedo v. Travellers Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 2d 353, 38 Cal. Rptr.
645 (1964). In that case the insurer attempted to deny coverage under its automobile
policy on the basis that the driver, driving with permission of the insured, had been
guilty of wilful misconduct. The court decided, contrary to the insurer's contention,
that the jury in the main action had found the driver merely negligent. Since a
finding of wilful misconduct would have exonerated both insured and insurer, the in-
surer was collaterally estopped from asserting this defense after the decision in the main
suit.
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the question of the insured's negligence after a default judgment estab-
lished his liability on that theory;0 5 (2) where the insurer attempted
to relitigate the question whether the obviously negligent conduct was
committed by the insured; 106 (3) where the insurer's contention of non-
coverage was first put in issue by the plaintiff's complaint; 0 7 and (4)
where the contention of noncoverage was first put in issue as an affirm-
ative defense.108  In all these cases collateral estoppel was properly ap-
plied because the insurer's interest in the main suit was aligned with
the interests of the insured. 109
105. Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 P. 110 (1931).
The courts generally do not apply collateral estoppel where a default judgment was
rendered in the prior action because no issues were litigated there. Lovejoy v. Ash-
worth, 94 N.H. 8, 45 A.2d 218 (1946); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.19, at 578
nn. 11-12 (1965); Development in the Lav-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 84041
(1952). However, the indemnitor, if afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to
defend, is bound in an action for indemnity by a default judgment that establishes the
liability of the indemnitee. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 107, comment f at 516-17
(1942).
106. Ford v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 151 Cal. App. 2d 431, 311 P.2d 930
(1957).
107. Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935).
108. Jones v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 121 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1941);
Artukovich v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 312, 310 P.2d 461
(1957).
The insurer's efforts to escape liability in Artukovich were ironic. The injured
party had sued under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The action was dismissed be-
cause the Industrial Accident Commission found that the injured party was not acting
within the scope of his employment with the insured at the time of the accident. The
injured party then sued in a tort proceeding which the insurer defended, contending
that the injured party was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the
accident and was therefore confined to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation
laws. If the insurer succeeded in its argument, the injured party would have been
effectively foreclosed from asserting his claim anywhere since the judgment of the pre-
vious action barred him from any further proceedings under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. But the insurer was unsuccessful. The court found that the order of the In-
dustrial Accident Commission was binding on the employment issue and the suit pro-
ceeded to judgment against the insured. 65 Cal. App. 2d at 317, 310 p.2d at 463.
As a result of the insurer's efforts, however, it was estopped in the subsequent
indemnity action from raising the exclusion in its policy of injuries incurred by an
employee of the insured acting in the scope of his employment. Id. at 318, 310 P.2d at
464. The court in the indemnity suit found that the employment question was con-
clusively determined in the personal injury action where the insurer was the insured's
privy. Id. Yet the court in the latter case settled the employment issue on the basis
of the conclusive determination of that question in the Workmen's Compensation pro-
ceedings--a proceeding in which the insurer had not been party or privy because of the
policy exclusion. Id at 317, 310 P.2d at 463. Therefore, if the insurer had not
raised the employment issue in the personal injury action, it would not have been
estopped from contesting it in the indemnity litigation. As a result of the insurer's at-
tempt to keep the injured party from any forum in which to assert his claim, the in-
surance company was itself barred from effectively raising the issue of noncoverage.
109. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra.
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California courts have not yet determined the limit of collateral
estoppel in cases where the interests of the insurer and insured are not
aligned. Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.110 is the point of departure
in this area. The insurance company in Gray claimed that if it had
defended the insured, its duty to him would have required it to deny that
he had intentionally caused the injuries. At the same time, its own
interests under the policy's exclusions would prompt it to admit inten-
tional conduct; thus it could not have defended the insured because
the defense would have embroiled it in a conflict of interests. 11
The insurer apparently believed that if it did not defend its own in-
terests in the personal injury suit, it would be estopped to assert its
rights in the subsequent suit on the issue of coverage. The court
discarded the insurance company's argument:
Since. . . the court in the third party suit does not adjudicate the
issue of coverage, the insurer's argument collapses. The only ques-
tion there litigated is the insured's liability. The alleged victim
does not concern himself with the theory of liability; he desires only
the largest possible judgment. Similarly, the insured and insurer
seek to avoid, or at least to minimize, the judgment. As we have
noted, modern procedural rules focus on whether, on a given set of
facts, the plaintiff, regardless of the theory, may recover. Thus
the question of whether or not the insured engaged in intentional
conduct does not normally formulate an issue which is resolved in
that litigation."
2
As a result, there was no conflict of interest, the court said, between
the insurer and the insured; the insurance company should have de-
fended the suit.
The court's reasoning was based upon the definition of collateral es-
toppel. If the issue was either not litigated or not essential to the de-
cision in the prior action, then a party is not precluded from litigating
that issue in a subsequent suit.
If one accepts the theory that application of collateral estoppel is
warranted only to the extent that the interests of the parties in a suit
are the same as the interests of their privies, but not where the interests
of the insurer and the insured conflict, clearly the California Supreme
Court in Gray only went part way in setting the proper limits for the
doctrine's application. The court recognized that its holding would
not apply when the theory of the insured's liability was clearly
determined either by a special jury verdict or in some other manner in
the personal injury suit. In such cases, by the court's own reasoning, the
theory of liability was litigated and essential to the final judgment;
therefore, collateral estoppel would apply." 3 When the time comes
110. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
111. Id. at 278-79, 419 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
112. Id.
113. Id. 279 n.18.
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when the court is squarely faced with this fact situation, it will have
great difficulty in avoiding the application of collateral estoppel because
of its reasoning in Gray. It would not have been presented with the
problem if it had simply adopted the policy reasons underlying the
Ratliff and Hammer decisions." 4
The court in Gray attempted to circumvent this potential trouble
spot in advance by suggesting:
In any event, if the insurer adequately reserves its rights to
assert the noncoverage defense later, it will not be bound by the
judgment. If the injured party prevails, that party or the insured
will assert his claim against the insurer. At this time the insurer
can raise the noncoverage defense previously reserved. In this
manner the interests of the insured and insurer in defending against
the injured party's primary suit will be identical; the insurer will
not face the suggested dilemma." 5
The court in Centennial Insurance Co. v. Miller"16 made this
suggested solution to the dilemma the basis of its holding that collateral
estoppel could not be invoked against the insurance company.1 7  In
Centennial the issue of collateral estoppel was raised by the defendants
when the insurer, after a prior personal injury action had determined
that the insured was merely negligent, brought a declaratory suit to
determine policy coverage and attempted to raise the policy defense that
the insured had intentionally caused the injuries. The court, faced
with a finding of liability clearly based on negligence,1 8 determined
that it need not decide whether collateral estoppel applied in a case
where the interests of the insurer and insured conflict. A reservation of
rights obtained by the insurer from the insured, said the court, placed
the case "outside the ambit of collateral estoppel. The parties to a
lawsuit may agree in advance to reserve the right to litigate matters in a
subsequent suit which might otherwise be precluded by res judicata or
estoppel." 9
Although the dictum in Gray and the holding in Centennial estab-
lished that a reservation of rights by the insurance company can preclude
the application of collateral estoppel in any case where the interests of
the insurer and the insured are not aligned, there are several reasons why
this patchwork arrangement does not serve as well as the type of ap-
proach used in Ratliff. A reservation of rights by the insurance company
has several important disadvantages. First, as with any provision of an
114. See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
115. 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 419 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
116. 264 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1967).
117. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 279, 419 P.2d 168, 178, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 118 (1966).
118. 264 F. Supp. at 433.
119. Id. at 435.
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insurance contract drawn in favor of the insurer, a reservation of rights
is strictly construed in favor of the insured. If the insurer is not care-
ful to include all possible contingencies in the reservation, a court may
well hold that collateral estoppel in a given set of circumstances is not
precluded by the particular reservation of rights involved.120 Further-
more, the insurer must make his reservation of rights promptly after
ascertaining that a possible defense exists.12
Second, there is some doubt whether, technically, a reservation of
rights, of itself, should preclude the operation of estoppel. The doc-
trine of collateral estoppel is based upon the public policy ground of
effective judicial administration. The parties to the insurance contract
should not be permitted to circumvent this policy by private agree-
ment.
22
The courts who do allow a reservation of rights to preclude the
operation of collateral estoppel in cases like Centennial, however, may
be justified in doing so because the insurer in such a case does not
really have a chance to litigate issues concerning its own interests. But
as Ratlif seemed to indicate, the reason that a judgment is not binding
in that case is not because of a reservation of rights, but because the
conflict of interests destroys any basis for collateral estoppel.' 2 ' Once
again, it becomes apparent that courts should approach the matter of
collateral estoppel directly rather than circumvent it by circuitous
theories. Centennial provides some encouragement that California may
eventually take this direct approach. Referring to the statements in
Gray quoted above, the court stated:
This statement by the Supreme Court of California might be suffi-
cient evidence of the state of the law in California to decide that
collateral estoppel does not apply to an insurer who has defended,
even if there were no reservation of the right to litigate coverage
later.'24
Conclusion
In California an injured person who becomes a judgment creditor
can sue the defendant's insurance company on the policy which it issued
to the defendant insured, whether or not the insurance company was
a party to the action.'25 The injured party, however, is not bound by
any suit between the insurer and the insured unless he is a party to that
120. Artukovich v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 312, 318-20,
310 P.2d 461, 464-65 (1957).
121. Farrell v. Merchants' Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 203 App. Div. 118, 196
N.Y.S. 383-85 (1922).
122. Note, Insurance Policy Defenses and Collateral Estoppel, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
140, 155 (1968).
123. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
124. 264 F. Supp. 431, 436 (E.D. Cal. 1967) (emphasis added).
125. CAL. INs. CODE § 11580(b) (2).
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suit. Thus a declaratory judgment that the facts of the case exclude
the injury from coverage is of little use to the insurance company if the
injured person is not a party to the declaratory action. For that reason,
the injured party is usually joined in an action for declaratory relief;'26
any determination in that action has the binding effect of collateral
estoppel in the subsequent suit between the injured party and the in-
sured. 12 7 A declaration that the insured acted intentionally within the
meaning of the policy, then, would necessarily establish the insured's
liability to the injured party.
This result violates public policy. Declaratory judgments are prop-
erly denied when they do substantial injury to the rights of the parties. 128
The presentation of the tort issue in a declaratory relief action to deter-
mine contract rights prejudices the position of the insured. He pays
regular premiums to insulate his assets from the sudden shock and
depletion of an adverse liability judgment. This protection is one of
the social policies favoring insurance. The insurance company's use of
declaratory relief, however, changes its relationship to the insured. It
then jeopardizes, rather than protects, the insured's savings, for if the
insurance company succeeds in the declaratory suit, the insured loses
the security of insurance and may have his own liability conclusively
established.
129
Without insurance, the injured party would then be the insured's
only foe in the controversy over his liability. In a declaratory relief
action, the insurer and the injured party are aligned against the insured.
This result is particularly harsh because a major reason motivating
the insured to purchase liability insurance is that the attorneys provided
by the insurance company may be more highly skilled than the attorney
which the insured could afford.Y°
The insurer violates its duty to defend in good faith if it maintains
anything in the main suit which harms the insured's interests."' If
the action is for declaratory relief, rather than a trial for damages, the in-
surance company can, with impunity, establish facts fatal to the in-
sured's interests in the suit for damages. For these reasons, the in-
surer's use of declaratory relief ironically contradicts the purpose and
policy favoring insurance. The courts should not allow this procedural
jockeying to transform the insurer from the insured's defender into
126. See 20 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTCE § 11371, at 166-68
(1963).
127. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
128. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 401 (R.I. 1968).
129. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
130. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 278, 419 P.2d 168, 178, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 114 (1966).
131. See cases cited note 37 supra.
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his prosecutor. Thus, in any case in which the facts that establish
noncoverage would harm the insured's interests in the main suit, the
insurer should not be allowed to raise its claim of noncoverage until
after the determination of the insured's tort liability is made.
If the insurer defends, and the jury determines that the case is
within the policy coverage, some courts collaterally estop the insurer
from later raising the defense of noncoverage, even though the insurer
could not have asserted it in the prior action.182 Although one sugges-
tion would be to allow the insurer to seek a declaratory judgment that
the facts were excluded from coverage, 8 3 the better rule would be to
allow the insurer to raise any point as a policy defense in a subsequent
action on the policy that it could not have asserted in the main action.
California law on this subject is still unsettled, but Gray and Centennial
have established a trend that suggests that California courts will even-
tually completely adopt the better rule and allow the insurer to assert
the defense of noncoverage against its insured after the personal injury
action, even if it obtains no reservation of rights.
William P. Wasserman*
132. See cases cited note 83 supra.
133. See cases cited note 16 supra.
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